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The Influence of Derridean Deconstruction on American Legal Theory

– PhD Thesis Abstract –

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PhD Thesis

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I. The subject and aim of the research

The theme of my doctoral thesis can be regarded as unique in many ways: although the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and the history of American legal thought sometimes appears in our national legal literature, until now the encounter of the these two topics hasn't been paid too much attention by the researchers of legal theory. The main reason of this matter could be the lacking of translations (in spite of there are some refreshing exceptions), of proper publications and texts upon these research fields that would support the starting of such work.

In the designation of my research I emphasize two ideas: firstly relevant legal philosophical elements of Derrida's work, and secondly the progressive-critical traditions of the American legal thought. Concerning Derrida, I have forborne to do a complete elaboration of his philosophy, and also I have insisted on the idea of presenting such lawyers whose theories are clearly influenced by the French philosopher

From the second half of the twentieth century (or if I want to be more precise: from the 60s and the 70s) the critique of the modern formalist-positivist legal theory got more and more apparent in the US. The critical legal movement wanted to rearrange the traditional modernist-formalist legal dogmas for the development of a more just society. These movements in many ways can be linked with the early twentieth century American legal realism and the continental Marxist, left wing political thought (Frankfurt School, Sartre etc.).

By the '80s these critical legal theories started to show the signs of exhaustion. The emancipatorical and critical branch of American (left wing) legal theory's found their means in the gender theory and Derrida's philosophy. The first appearances of deconstruction in American legal thought were marked by a handful of publication which used the „methods" and concepts of deconstruction.

The deconstruction is one of the most pronounced and highly regarded school of the literary theory and philosophy, which is originated in the works of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction appeared as the critique of structuralism in the literary theory. Its philosophical base is the *criticism of logocentrism* which is a rejection of the view that behind the words there is something that insures their validity or an ontological-metaphysical reality. Our words and concepts are signs which are not indicate the things themselves but symbolize them. In the view of deconstruction the things and words that indicate them are in constant slippage – or with Derrida's expression: *différance*.

The deconstructive activity is a reading practice of the literary and philosophical text with the aim of disruption of the underlying dichotomies of the text. The deconstructivists see violent

structures in the conceptual structures of the literary and philosophical texts. The purpose of deconstructive reading is to indicate that relationship of these dichotomies is more problematic and unclear than it seems. Their goal is not to turn the hierarchies upside down but to reinterpret these concepts and dichotomies.

The view that the deconstruction is some kind of method or technique was always denied by Derrida and his followers but Jack Balkin showed that there are knacks of it that can be mastered. Derrida said that the deconstruction was not a method, not a meta-science but a phenomenon that *„goes through every discipline".* This universal „go-through" was the key to its success. After the occupation of the literary and philosophical departments it spread among the social sciences and even in law schools.

The common history of deconstruction, legal theory and ethics (after the prelude of some 80s publications) started with a conference in 1989 which called *The Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice* that was organised by Drucilla Cornell at the Cardozo School of Law.

Jacques Derrida's keynote speech titled The Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority became the central text of the legal deconstruction. Here it was said proverbially: *„deconstruction is justice".* Through Emmanuel Lévinas' ethics the deconstruction came with a strong moral sense in the service of justice which opposes the conceptual rigidness of law.

II. Research method

The greatest difficulty through my work was to make this vast and multilayered subject somehow manageable and transparent. By the beginning of my research – somewhat naively – I had a premise that there is a school of deconstructive legal theory with defined methods, political stances and prominent figures. But as I dug deeper into the literature and the subject it has become clear that in spite of the numerous mentions of Derrida and deconstruction in the American legal literature these publications were too shallow also in profoundness of analysis and the knowledge of Derrida's philosophy as well. The Preface of the book *Derrida and Legal Philosophy* confirmed my suspicion that what I called in the called „derridean deconstruction's influence on American legal theory" was actually a *spoiled, misinterpreted, subtle reception* that did not grounded a true school of thought. The Deconstruction was even among the French philosopher's most well versed American experts but one subject of the many.

By this discretion I choose an author based approach. But I did not give up some subject centred analysis and through the different authors I deal with one special subject of deconstruction and law.

Essentially in my thesis there are two question which play a major role: firstly the effect of derridean critique of *sign and writing* on the legal interpretation, secondly (which is emphasized more) derridean concept of justice. According to these questions I analyse four authors in my thesis: Drucilla Cornell, Jack Balkin and Michel Rosenfeld and besides (somewhat „out of place") Peter Goodrich.

In my research I tried to stay strictly on the field of legal theory (if one can draw the boundaries of a discipline at all), thus I did not deal with the reception of deconstruction in literary theory, and I also did not treat comprehensively Derrida's thought on ethics and political philosophy. Even though it would be very likely that I should touch the American law and literature field but I haven't done it, because in my opinion Derrida's influence did not came as literary theorist but as a postmodern philosopher. Without doubt by the Departments and research groups of French Theory there have came a huge continental (in this case French) import but in the American thought its influence was indirect. For Michel Foucault is not the subject of my thesis I did not wrote about him either, but let me remark that Derrida and Foucault have some common features and moreover, nowadays American political and philosophical thinking is indebted of Foucault's philosophy, but this influence should be the topic of an independent research.

In my opinion Derrida's keynote speech called *Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority* presents in a complex view all his relevant thought on law, and I consider his later writings more related to the political philosophy.

According to my author centred approach I did not aspire to completeness either on Derrida or upon the American legal literature. My intention was to give a comprehensive picture on the main concepts of Derrida's philosophy but with emphasis on its consequences on legal theory. And while I have presented the appearances of derridean thoughts and themes at the different authors, I constantly kept an eye on Derrida. I feel that I can't miss the explanation on why these four authors are central in my thesis.

Drucilla Cornell[1] is a legal theorist who treats two of my main topic (justice and interpretation). Her theory is complex and very faithful to the original ideas of Derrida. Her book entitled *The Philosophy of the Limit* is maybe by this time the biggest step forward on making the deconstruction a true legal theory.

[1] Drucilla Cornell American feminist lawyer, Professor of the Rutgers University, she holds lectures at the South-African University of Pretoria and the Brickbeck College London. Before her academic career she was a union lawyer. Her research is linked to the feminist political philosophy.

Michel Rosenfeld[2] in his book entitled *Just Interpretations* indicated that Derrida's philosophy had a huge influence on him. I find his work interesting because he did not just speak about what great perspective can be opened up by the deconstruction on the subject of justice and legal interpretation but he elaborated this issue on a very practical and important theme: the tension between pluralism and legal interpretation. Rosenfeld as a comparative constitutional lawyer used Derrida's insights with the American and continental European legal thoughts, and by their critique he created the theory of comprehensive pluralism, that bears the signs of Derrida in a way that it does not seem clearly apparent that here we speak about deconstruction.

The treatment of Jack Balkin's work[3] is unavoidable if one speaks about the American legal deconstruction, because his scholarship raises the questions of not just the legal deconstruction but deconstruction itself. According to me his publications are emblematic because he was insisted on – against the intention of Derrida and his followers – making deconstruction a legal method. This experience is full of discrepancies and in later chapters of my thesis it turns out that Balkin had to give some of his own standpoints up.

The above mentioned three authors' common point is the questions of justice and legal interpretation, but with different approach.

The last author I mention is Peter Goodrich[4] who sticks out in many ways of the line but I consider his scholarship exemplary and important. Although Goodrich is from Great Britain, but he resides in the US and teaches at the Cardozo School of Law and now he is more linked to the American legal academy than the English (though he has publication on the history of English legal thought). Goodrich got a place in my thesis because he is one of the last members of the critical legal studies great generation, and his scholarship is a great example of where the derridean critique of sign could lead the legal research, which in this case is the interaction of law with its visual culture (which I mean the effect of audiovisual contents of

[2] Michel Rosenfeld american constitutional lawyer, by now he is University Professor of Law and Comparative Democracy, the Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights and Director, Program on Global and Comparative Constitutional Theory at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. He holds lectures at many universities as Visiting Professor Vendégprofesszor one for example at the CEU in Hungary. He was was the president of the International Association of Constitutional Law from 1999 to 2004. He was the director of International Association of Constitutional Law from 1999 to 2004. He was the founding editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Constitutional Law (I•CON) from 2001 to 2014. In 2004 he received the French government's highest and most prestigious award, the Legion of Honor. His main research field is constitutional law and comparative constitutional law.

[3] Jack Balkin american constitutional lawyer Professor of Yale Univerity. The founding director of Yale Information Society Project, and publicist of The Atlantic. His scholarship linked to legal and sociological effects of the telecommunications, internet- and information technology.

[4] Peter Goodrich English legal theorist, currently the Professor of Cardozo School of Law-n. His scholarship includes law, literature and semiotics.

current multimedia effect on the world). Goodrich does not interested in the concept of Justice (what Derrida held high regard) but maybe this can offer us another perspective on the subject.

III. Summary of the research

The main argument of my thesis on Derrida can be summarized by the following:

1. Jacques Derrida is a follower of the post-nietzschean philosophical tradition and can be regarded as a strongly *anti-essentialist philosopher* who criticizes the logocentrical bias of western philosophies. With reference to the definition of deconstruction I emphasized that only after its reception it seemed to be a central notion, from the beginning it was only one of the French philosopher's many wordplays.

2. Derrida's greatest contribution to the legal theory is his lecture entitled *The Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority*. He links the law with violence and opposes it with justice. The ground of this notion is the insight that law is always the instrument of a pre-legal force which came in textual form. The textual form of the law and the „law as justice" based in pure force contradict the derridean justice which has strong roots in the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas.

3. This above mentioned bond between law and violence links Derrida to the *tradition of the positivist legal thought* but on a peculiar way he argues a straight critique of a legal thinking that I would call modern legal thought. But I want to remark that when Derrida speaks about the law and laws his approach is not juristical. The law in Derrida's theory an artificial construct that come to life by violence and exist with violence, without a force there is no point in speaking about law. When I bond Derrida's thought with the tradition of legal positivism I don't speak about a mature positivist legal theory, it is merely a "vulgar" view of law, a law that is the tool of power or a manifestation of it, instead of a "valuable social reality" that is related to the nature of human relations and the nature of things.

4. In the analysis of the notion that *„deconstruction is justice"* I worked around the question what this justice does mean that ensures criticism of justice and the possibility of deconstruction. The analysis of the *three derridean aporia of justice and law* lead me to the conclusion that the justice for the French philosopher is not a strict normative framework but an ethical relationship in which we owe to the Other person. Consequently we should follow the unique justice of singular situations, and that does not permit the mechanical application of the rules. I compared Derrida's concept of justice with Aristotle's thought in Nicomachean

Ethics and I come to the conclusion that what the French philosopher was really looking for is not else but *equity*.

5. After I made clear Derrida's thought on justice I investigated what intellectual context did arrived his philosophy. As Derrida also pointed out the encounter of critical legal studies and deconstruction was not a great surprise but it would be a hasty statement to draw equation between them. The first endeavour to surpass the langdelian liberal legal tradition appeared in the first decades of the twentieth century by American legal realists, but it became a genuine and comprehensive – and it seems to be one with lasting effects – legal school in the latter half of the century as the critical legal studies. It was a little academic circle consists of Marxist lawyers and political activists. The members of their first generation were – only mentioning the most important figures – Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Duncan Kennedy and Alan Hunt. The CLS showed the signs of exhaustion in the '80s when a new generation stepped up. They are important to my research because in the publications of these authors appeared the first explicit mentioning of Derrida and deconstruction.

6. Form the 80s I refer to four thinkers (Gerald E. Frug, Gary Peller. Clare Dalton and Jack Balkin) who used in their own scholarship the deconstruction and Derrida's philosophy. I emphasize that each these lawyers approached the deconstruction very differently and it is hard to set a common feature in them. I want to indicate it is Jack Balkin who will be important because he tried to make the deconstruction a working *legal method.*

7. During my research in contrast to my previous expectations I have found out that despite of the numerous mentioning of „Derrida" and „deconstruction" in the '90s publication in the US, these citations were superficial and seemed secondary to the argumentation. According to the publications of Peter Goodrich and Pierre Schlag the reception of Derrida's philosophy has been failed. What happened was a subtle unsaid reception that never came out as derridean influence. The cause of this matter was that in the mainstream academic circles considered Derrida and the other postmodern continental European philosophers as a suspicious nihilist thinker and one (a lawyer) who thinks himself good never treat seriously. Moreover, the derridean deconstruction in its original form held the idea of slow reading and multilayered text, and the American thought can't get this because in the pragmatic approach of American thought the question is always „how can I influence the judicial decision on behalf of my client?". That's how the '90s bustling intellectual life around the deconstruction has waned and only the term of „deconstruction" remained but it has *disconnected* from the original philosophical context.

8. Exactly this above mentioned pragmatism that made Jack Balkin as the main figure of the American legal deconstruction. He was well regarded by the mainstream academic circles but he was slightly denounced by the other Derrida followers. The reason of this was his idea that the deconstruction can be a legal method. But according to the followers of Derrida the strength of deconstruction lies in its capability of questioning the status quo, opening up new and better interpretations. Justice (as we see in Derrida's writings) is not a fixed point but an unreachable principle; the desire for a just society without oppression.

In my thesis I present four thinkers with two subjects: the elaboration of the derridean concept of justice and the derridean critique of sign and its application on law.

9. Michel Rosenfeld searches the means of a just interpretation using deconstruction. His purpose is to create a theory of legal interpretation that can be reconciled with the contested values of a pluralist society. Rosenfeld clearly builds on Derrida's somewhat levinasian notions of Subject–Other that appeared in The Force of Law. The contested values have the same relationship as in the Subject–Other dichotomy. According to Rosenfeld the task of a legal interpretation is to offer an interpretation that creates harmony between the conflicting values.

10. The key concept of Rosenfeld's theory is the *comprehensive pluralism* that has to avoid two dangers: the monism of values and the relativism. The comprehensive pluralism is not methodological pluralism, nor is it a mechanically applicable method (in this sense it can be parallel with deconstruction as Derrida means it). The purpose of the comprehensive pluralism is to open up the hierarchy of values in the society, and within this discursive space reconcile their antagonism. In the end it reduces the violence and oppression in the society by – on macro-sociological level – placing the values under the term of „Good". These values were on the periphery of society's value structure, but now they are equally respected.

Rosenfeld distincts *values of the first and second order*, the former are the particular values of the society, the latter are the own values of comprehensive pluralism: *autonomy, reciprocity, dignity and diversity*. Rosenfeld emphasizes that by his theory there is not a good way to reconcile the conflicting values but it is very important that the end of the day it should create a more just society where no one can be exposed to oppression.

11. However Rosenfeld's theory stumbles in a problem: in hard cases (like right for life for the unborn person or fetus) he realizes that his theory hits the wall and it is hard to give proper answers. In his view religious and ontological reasons – even the ones that held as clear truths

by the classical legal philosophy – can't be the basis of a commonly shared tenet of a society, and in his opinion these arguments should step back to give room to the comprehensive pluralism and its goals. By this Rosenfeld takes away the opportunity to give law a chance to answer its own great questions and define its core concepts and lets these questions to fall into the hands of politics and the logic of power.

12. Drucilla Cornell placed her notions on derridean deconstruction and law in a complex philosophical framework. Cornell has drawn sources from three thinkers: *Hegel* for his idea of legal personhood and reciprocal symmetry, *Emmanuel Lévinas* for his ethics of Other and *Robert Cover's* nomos theory. This philosophical framework ensured Cornell to create a very own theory using Derrida's thoughts on law as a starting point. Her main goal was as opposed to the positivist legal thought that in legal interpretation build on the present (or past) legal decisions (and this way has a strong consensual streak), to create a creative theory of legal interpretation that is open to the future. This theory, albeit has many common feature of Derrida's philosophy but it is so unique that she gave it a new name: *the philosophy of the limit*.

13. According to the philosophy of the limit the lawyer represents the future, the aim of the legal interpretation is not to reconstruct the present meanings but through using the presently given conceptual apparatus creating a better society. Cornell delimited her concept of Good (that orientates the interpretation) delimited from the positivist notions (that equates the Good with legal prescriptions) and also from the irrationalist-nihilist views (that describes the Good as an absolute absence). In the philosophy of the limit the Good is an *ontological disruption* that opens up the question of „what is?" The concept of Good gives us the opportunity to take a serious and critical point of view on the prescriptions of law, constantly questioning their righteousness and if we feel disturbance, then we can shape the meaning of the textual law by the legal interpretation. Cornell summarized her theory by pointing out that in the judicial legal interpretation a movement of *exploration and invention* is always necessary. By the redeemer character of the judge it is clear that Cornell affirms an activist role of the judiciary and it is not an anomaly but right and should be favoured. In my conclusion – agreeing with Jacques De Ville – I said that the philosophy of the limit is in many ways on the border of legal theory and really it should be considered as a *programme for political action*.

14. Jack Balkin – in his contradictory way – is one of the most significant figures of deconstruction in the American legal theory. But in his scholarship we can sense some kind of

change and I would say there is two period of his scholarly activity: the firstly he tried to adapt the derridean concepts and ideas to the legal theory. In the second period (which is marked with a single publication entitled *Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendental Justice*) he gave Derrida's concept of justice a central role and strongly opposed it with the widely held opinions on deconstruction.

In his first publications he made clear that in his opinion the deconstructive techniques legal adaptation would ensure the criticism of the ideological basis of legal systems. In this framework the concepts of the dichotomical oppositions, the différance and iterability held central stage. Balkin's own concepts called *nested oppositions* and *ideological drift* are clearly the developments of the original derridean notions, and can be considered as slavish repetitions.

15. The interesting thing about Balkin's scholarship is the insight that deconstruction can't be without a subject. It leads to a more important question: how does deconstructor uses the above mentioned conceptual apparatus to question the ideological basis of legal system, so what do we deconstruct?

Pierre Schlag criticised Balkin's theory because he reckons that Balkin turned the original text centric approach of the deconstruction into a methodological-individualist – and in Schlag's opinion sartrean – theory which gives away some the main force of deconstruction.

16. Balkin in his last lengthier publication on deconstruction analyzed the question of justice but surprisingly not on the basis of *Force of Law* and Lévinas but two of Derrida's publication on the Paul de Man affair (that was about some publications of de Man during the Second World War). Balkin's aim was to find out does justice really meant to Derrida. He treats this issue in the following six senses: 1. subjects of justice (as law), 2. limitless responsibility, 3. speaking in the Other's language, 4. the singularity of every situation, 5. understanding the Other's point of view, 6. deconstruction as an anti-totalitarian analysis. In the treatment of these questions Balkin makes huge changes on the original derridean notions, and he expresses his opinion that in place of anti-humanist language of the deconstruction we should concentrate on the singular acting person.

17. The transcendental deconstruction based on the principle that the justice exists but it is *indeterminable*. Deconstruction is a normative chasm which lies between the present social relations and the ideal of (just) social relations. In harmony with the original derridean thoughts Balkin said that in the present nothing can be called just, but it does not mean that the values themselves not exist (according to Balkin the *values are internal driving forces*, desires). The American constitutional lawyer want to remark that it is not enough to point out

that there is a slippage between the actual and ideal relationships, because these arguments on the chasm can be deconstructed as well. Balkin elaborates three solutions of the problem: firstly if we assume a *transcendental subject* who can understand and comprehend the whole world (that is a Hegelian answer). The second one is *semantic materialism*: in this sense the signs are physical traces and for their existence doesn't need to assume a subject that reads them, they can be without one (this solution appears in the derridean corpus). The third solution is a *rehabilitation of the subject*, of the concept of man who is not only a product of its culture but is also its creator.

18. In the chapter of Goodrich I refer more thoroughly to logocentrism and writing critique, and from this standpoint I elaborated further Goodrich's argument on the Grammatology and legal textuality. According to the English legal theorist the legal thinking is still held by the logocentric bias of western philosophy that based on many metaphysical assumptions. He points out that a law book based discourse of the law excludes an important element of its examination: the *visuality*. He distinguishes three different periods of the inscription of law: logo-, grapho- and video sphere. The consecutive reign of speech, writing and video (picture) determinates the *social presence of law and its authority*. According to Goodrich a main concept of Derrida's philosophy is not deconstruction but grammatology, and the research of the social inscription of the signs could take us closer to understand the law. The grammatology treats the culture of book and its linear, text-based thought, and it can lead us to the criticism of the traditional view of language in law.

For Goodrich the code gives the legal argumentation its authority (in this regard he owes very much to Foucault's theory of discourse). He argues that the code firstly was rather and indication to the presence of the sovereign (lawmaker), and its purpose was to visually ground the authority of legal argumentations. The *code is the sign of the absent lawmaker*; its authority came from who is not there.

19. According to Goodrich the above mentioned three periods of writing also constitute the history of circulation of power. Our ideas on law are greatly affected by the context in which it is represented, and how accessible it is to the society. In the ages before the printing with its hand drawn codices, it was understandable that the law was an „esoteric" science. The printing not only opened the law up for other social strata, but the linear model of book has also given the question that behind this – in that age mostly episodically – appearing text is there any central notion or system? Nowadays the *social inscription of law* is largely based on pictures and that has a fundamental effect on the social presence of law, but the lawyers still

stick to their books. The contemporary visual culture not only terminates the lawyers exclusive power over the interpretation of some questions of legality (and the evaluation of law itself), but also our attitude to law.

20. Goodrich emphasizes two questions that also elaborate in my thesis: firstly the *connection between law and theatre* and secondly *the lasting visual narratives in law*. He points out that pictures and the subtly used visual narratives can efface the anomalies of law and we can have a better understanding of law. But as far as I concerned the theory of Goodrich does not calculate with the notion that the understanding of pictures is easier only on the surface level on behalf of the recipient: in fact the pictures and visual narratives are also context based and can have messages beyond the author's intentions, so they can be deconstructed. Actually, the *interpretation of pictures is not less problematic than of the text*. Moreover, moving from the text to the visuals does not get us to some radical renewal of postmodern notion on law and power.

For final words I want to emphasize that any further research in this subject should examine the wider context of Derrida's influence because it is noticeable that at none of these thinkers played Derrida such a central role that can be considered as exclusive. Moreover, one can say for these four authors Derrida was *just one theme amongst others* with whom they could renew the vocable and argumentation of critical legal theories.

The word deconstruction has been dislocated from the original derridean intentions and after the death of the philosopher it has started to live its own life to be used in various ways. For the legal theory it has not became an important, individual legal school, and maybe the reason is Derrida's turn to ethics and politics from the beginning of the '90s. Thus for the American lawyers this very ethical concept of justice was not a productive idea. Peter Goodrich and other authors find this regrettable, but despite of this failed reception it is very likely that in the future we shall see a second wind of the philosophy of Derrida. Although, it will may not come under the name of „deconstruction".

IV. Publications on the subject of the thesis

- Drucilla Cornell és a határ filozófiája
  Jogelméleti szemle 2016/1. (2016. április 1.) 38-50. p.
- Logosz, írás, képek és jog – Peter Goodrich *„Grammatológia”*- értelmezése
  Jogelméleti szemle 2015/2. (2015. július 9.) 43-52. p.
- A dekonstrukció megszelídítése: Jack Balkin dekonstruktivista jogelmélete
  Jogelméleti szemle 2014/4. (2014. december 9.) 48-56. p.
- Szempontok a derridai dekonstrukció amerikai jogelméleti recepciójának vizsgálatához
  Jogelméleti szemle 2014/2. (2014. június 23.) 1-16. p.
- [Frivaldszky Jánossal közösen] Pluralizmus és jogértelmezés – Michel Rosenfeld dekonstrukciója
  Pázmány Working Papers 2014/1. (2014. január) 1-17. p.
- Jacques Derrida és a jogfilozófia
  Jogelméleti Szemle 2013/2. (2013. július 5.) 1-15. p.
- A derridai dekonstrukció találkozása a Critical Legal Studies-zal – avagy a jogértelmezés kérdése Drucilla Cornell elméletében
  Jogelméleti Szemle 2012/2. (2012. július 5.) 1-9.

Other publications of the Author

Paper:

- Vita és megismerés – Retorika és dialektika a klasszikus és posztmodern korban (OTDK pályamunka)
  De Iurisprudentia et iure publico 2011/4. 1-47. p.

Review:

- Ződi Zsolt: Jogi adatbázisok és jogi forráskutatás. Gépek a jogban.
  Állam- és Jogtudomány 2014/1. 127-130. p.
- Stephen G. Gey: The Postmodern Censorship Theory
  Iustum Aequum Salutare 2011/2. 195-198. p.